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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/01/2008

Accident number: 482

Accident time: 6:16

Accident Date: 21/08/2006

Where it occurred: Schull Mountain,
Schull Village, Rasht
District

Country: Tajikistan

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 31/08/2006

ID original source: None

Name of source: TMAC

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 18/01/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:
Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Alt. coord. system:
Map east: 39° 01' 12.2" E

Map north: 070° 19' 33" N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate training (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in 2007. Its conversion to a DDAS file has led
to some of the original formatting being lost. The text of the report is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity. The original files, including all Annexes, are held on record. Text in [ ] is
editorial.

REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY
INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT AT SHULL MOUNTAIN ON 21 AUGUST 2006
Dushanbe 31 August 2006
References:
•

Map, General Staff Series 1984 J 42 33, Sheet no 10 42 033.

•

TMAC National Mine Action Standards Dated 29 October 2005.

•

[International demining group] SOP Part Four – Minefield Clearance.

INTRODUCTION
1. As a result of a mine accident on 21 August 2006, in which demining operator [the Victim]
was injured, a Board of Inquiry was convened by the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre to
conduct an investigation on behalf of the government, in accordance with National Mine
Action Standards. The initial report of this accident is shown at Annex A.
2. The accident involved a Mine Clearance Team (MCT) from [International demining group]
Dushanbe which was clearing an area of ground known to be mined, near the village of
Shull, in the Rasht Valley region of Tajikistan.
3. The Board of Inquiry comprised:
a) Chair (CTA TMAC) [Name removed]
b) Member (MOD) [Name removed]
c) Member (TMAC) [Name removed]
d) Assistant [Name removed] (UNDP)
4. [International demining group] appointed one observer to the Board of Inquiry – [Name
removed].
5. A copy of the Board's Terms of Reference is attached at Annex B.

SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING
6. TMAC designates this task as TS IS 58 and a Red Task Folder has been issued for the
task, in accordance with normal procedures. The first Red Task Folder was issued
complete with the Impact Survey form (Tajik - original), Suspect Hazardous Area (SHA)
sketch map, Impact Survey form, topographical maps 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scales, to
[International demining group] Manager, [Name removed] on 20 May 2004 by TMAC
IMSMA Officer, [Name removed]. The original task started on 25 May 2004.
Contents of Red Task Folder
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•

Impact Survey form: TMAC

•

Impact Survey form (Tajik, Original): [International demining group]

•

Topographic Maps 1:50,000 scale:TMAC

•

Topographic Maps 1:100,000 scale: TMAC

•

Suspect Hazardous Area (SHA) sketch map: [International demining group]

7. Although it may be sometimes considered unusual to clear landmines from such areas as
mountain tops, this mine clearance task is considered a priority because it is associated
with grazing and farming land. The area provides approximately 300,000 square metres
of ground for agriculture, based on the nearby village of Shull. The formal procedure for
tasking was through the TMAC; the area was first identified after [International demining
group]’s General Survey of the area in 2003/4 and the sequence of tasking originated
from TMAC.
8. From late 2005 until 2 July 2006, there was no demining activity in this location, initially
due to seasonal poor weather conditions and then through delays in funding, which
delayed the start of [International demining group]’s basic training courses for deminers.
9. The team arrived on site on 2 July 2006 and set up camp on that day. Start-of-season remarking of the area and then clearance activities began on the next day, 03 July.
10. At the time of the accident 18 deminers were at work along with two Section Leaders and
one Team Leader. On the morning of the accident the deminers began working at
0500hrs. [International demining group] working practices at this site require that each
deminer normally works for fifty minutes before taking a ten-minute break and then restarting the work-break-work routine. This has been their standard procedure since
demining activities in this mine field resumed on 2 July 2006. The accident occurred at
about 6:16 am.
11. Activities on each [International demining group] task site are recorded within the pages
of an [International demining group] Team Leader’s Logbook. Example pages from the
logbook used at this task site are shown at Annex C.
12. National Mine Action Standards require that a copy of Standing Operational Procedures
is held on each task site. One copy was available for reference at this task site.

GEOGRAPHY
13. The accident occurred near the village of Shull, in Rasht district. Lat/Lon 070° 19′ 33″ N,
39° 01′ 12.2″ E. Elevation is approximately 1950 metres above sea level. Map sheet 10
42 033. See map at Annex D.
14. The general area where the accident occurred is grassy pastureland, in a mountainous
region above the western side of the village of Shull. The point of detonation occurred
within a rocky outcrop inside the working area of a deminer involved in the clearance of
ground as part of his normal duties at that location.
15. The minefield is situated on the top of a very steep-sided hill and the clearance lane
where the accident occurred is on mixed stony and grassy ground within a rocky outcrop
on the north western side of Shull Mountain.
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16. The full extent of the mined area in this location is uncertain. Local information and
information from MoD indicates at least 300,000 square metres are contaminated with
800 PMN mines on the area, as well as an unknown number of OZM-72 bounding
fragmentation mines. The mines were originally laid to protect at least four anti-aircraft
gun positions and perhaps a further four mortar positions, sited on Shull Mountain as part
of local protection for Garm airport. There are no known minefield records for this area.
Since 25 May 2004 approximately 50,000 square metres of ground have been cleared.
Eleven OZM-72 and seven items of unexploded ordnance have been found and
destroyed. No PMN mines had been found on the area prior to this accident.
[The picture below shows the rocky outcrop where the accident occurred.]

17. There is no road onto the area and to reach the minefield a very substantial walk of two
kilometres, with a vertical height gain of over six hundred metres, is required.
18. The nearest inhabited buildings are at the village of Shull, approximately two kilometres
away to the west from the accident site. The town of Garm is approximately ten
kilometres away.
19. Weather conditions at the site on the day of the accident and during the inquiry were dry,
warm and sunny and there had been no rain or cold weather during the preceding week.
The ground was dry at the time of the accident.
20. The [International demining group] demining team at Shull are living in a tented camp
approximately four hundred and fifty metres from the minefield and are supported by
[International demining group] with sufficient primary health care, shelter and food. Water
is collected on a daily basis by using a donkey to carry water in containers from a nearby
mountain stream.
21. Further images of the site and the general area are shown at Annex E.

PRIORITY OF TASK
22. This task was designated as high priority by TMAC, after meetings with and
representations from the local government in the area. During [International demining
group]’s initial survey of the area, in 2003, local inhabitants verbally reported up to sixteen
human accidents on the area. Some of these accidents have been formally reported and
are recorded in the national IMSMA database. Others are anecdotal and little formal
information is known about them.
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
23. Marking of the area between cleared and uncleared areas is in accordance with
[International demining group]’s Standing Operational Procedures. Marking in clearance
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lanes and elsewhere on the site was adequate, but could be improved. A plan of the site
is attached at Annex F showing the areas of clearance.
24. Suggested improvements:
e) Sign boards should be erected to show locations of medical area, detector
test area etc.
f)

Mark ‘Hotline’ (a rolling start-line that can be advanced as land is cleared and
QA on it is completed) beyond which PPE must be worn.

g) Mark a formal Control Point, where deminers and visitors are briefed, maps
are maintained and where personnel may gather in an emergency, if so
instructed.
25. When the mines were laid in 1995, no marking was emplaced by the troops who put
down the mines. The only marking currently on the site was placed there by [International
demining group]’s demining teams and this consists of wooden pickets, plastic marking
tape and mine warning triangles, in accordance with their own Standing Operational
Procedures and UN International Mine Action Standards. The route from the ambulance
parking place at the bottom of the hill to the task site area at the top of the hill is marked
with red-painted rocks to indicate the line of the pathway.
26. The accident occurred within a marked clearance lane which was being cleared at the
time of the accident. The next nearest clearance lane to where the accident occurred is
25 metres away from the point of detonation and the nearest working deminer at the time
of the explosion was working in that lane.

SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
27. The mine action team working on this task live in a tented encampment on the task site
area, approximately four hundred and fifty metres to the south of the main works area.
[International demining group] have a total of twenty-seven personnel working on this
project task site and these are managed and monitored by supervisor [Name removed],
who arrived on site on 11 August 2006 to replace outgoing supervisor [Name removed
who was leaving to take up a task at another mine clearance site. Before departure [The
outgoing supervisor] stayed for one day together with [the new supervisor] to ensure that
he was familiar with the task site and the works there.
28. A demining team logbook was available to record visitors and routine daily events at the
site. See Annex C. As well as the supervisor, the mine action unit on Shull Mountain
consists of one Team Leader, eighteen deminers and support personnel as shown in the
diagram below. [Diagram omitted.]
29. Routine management visits by [International demining group] quality assurance and
technical supervisors are not made as regularly as they should be because expatriate
personnel who should be deployed to Tajikistan are not deployed.
30. Every other night deminers have night-time sentry duty to guard the demining camp site
and work area. [The Victim] was on duty between 0200hrs to 0400hrs on the morning of
the accident.

QUALITY ASSURANCE
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31. On-site management, supervision and Quality Assurance (QA) of works at the task site
are the responsibility of the supervisor. In the August Logbook there is no page for Quality
Control.
32. In support of the on-site supervisor there is normally a formal regime of internal
supervision and inspection for the work of all of [International demining group]’s Mine
Action Teams. Their work is also regulated by UN International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS), Tajikistan National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and the organisation’s own
Standing Operational Procedures (SOP).
33. [International demining group] report that their managers should routinely visit their teams
and work sites on an occasional basis, approximately once each week. This should
include visits either by the expatriate Project Manager, the expatriate Operations Officer
or their local national counterparts. However, the only recorded visit from any senior
manager or expatriate adviser to this task site was on 13 July 2006 when [Name
removed], [International demining group] [national] Operations Officer made a visit to
destroy an anti personnel mine which had been found on the site. This visit is shown in
the site log book.
34. As well as [International demining group]’s internal Quality Control, TMAC normally
inspects all task sites through the national Quality Assurance Officer. The most recent
inspection by the TMAC QA Officer was on 19 July 2006. See TMAC QA Report at Annex
G.
35. As part of internal Quality Control (QC) procedures, the Supervisor, Team Leader or
Section Leader at the task site is required to check each area cleared to ensure that no
signals are received from a metal detector when it is passed over areas which have been
cleared by a deminer. In this instance Section Leader [Name removed] checked a
completed five-metre long lane which had been cleared by [the Victim] immediately prior
to the first morning rest break on the day of the accident and this was confirmed by Team
Leader [Name removed]. To mark the limit of his QC inspection, [Name removed] marked
the end of the checked lane with a green marker picket as required by [International
demining group] normal working practices. The picket was still in place during the Board
of Inquiry inspection of the site after the accident. [The Victim] then took his ten-minute
rest break as planned and then came back to his place of work to start a new clearance
lane adjacent to the one he had just completed.

COMMUNICATIONS
36. [International demining group]’s communications network on Shull Mountain is based on
handheld VHF radios for internal contact within the task site area and mobile telephones
for external contact.
37. Routine twice-daily reports are made to [International demining group]’s Dushanbe HQ
office from the Shull task site by mobile telephone.
38. On the day of the accident, three mobile telephones were on site, but team leader [Name
removed] called by radio to one of the vehicles at the bottom of the hill and sent the driver
in it to inform the hospital at Garm that a casualty would soon be on the way to them.
[The Team Leader] informed the Board of Inquiry that, at the time of the accident, this
seemed the best way to inform the hospital about what was happening, but agrees that
he should have called the hospital directly himself.
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MEDICAL
39. One person was directly involved and injured in the accident; [the Victim], a local national
Ministry of Defence deminer employed by [International demining group] who was
deployed to the site as part of his routine duties managed by [International demining
group] Dushanbe.
40. [The Victim] received serious blast and secondary fragmentation injuries to his face. A
little over one hour after the accident occurred he was treated at Garm hospital where he
received emergency surgery to stem the bleeding from his face before being evacuated
by helicopter to the Russian Military Hospital in Dushanbe on the same day. A report from
the Russian Military Hospital states that the casualty received the following injuries:
h) Mine explosion trauma. Concussion of the brain.
i)

Multiple fragmentation and penetration injuries to the face, with both eyeballs
eviscerated.

j)

Open fragmentation fracture of the left tibia with likelihood of full recovery.
(Originally written as ‘Open fragmentation fracture of the left shinbone with
satisfactory of standing fracture’).

k) Open fracture of middle base of phalanx on the second finger of the right
hand.
l)

Fragmentation injuries to left knee and right thigh.

m) Level 1 Shock.
41. Deminer [Deminer 1] was working close to the victim and, after the mine detonated,
arrived at the scene of the accident first. Team Leader [Name removed] arrived
immediately after. The team leader instructed another deminer who had been working
nearby, [Deminer 2], to clear a path to the casualty and the area surrounding him. The
casualty was then carried by fellow deminers to a designated intermediate medical
treatment point on a cleared area of ground approximately one-hundred and twenty-five
metres from the point of detonation where the medic from Section Number Two, [Name
removed], was stationed. During the next few minutes, during which time the second
medic arrived and preparations were made to treat and stabilize the casualty, the two
medics treated his injuries. Medics continued to give medical attention as he was carried,
on a stretcher, away from the minefield and down the mountain, towards the ambulance
park two kilometres downhill.
42. All [International demining group] operations normally deploy with a qualified medic as
part of the team; a comprehensive trauma and first aid pack and a fully equipped
ambulance vehicle appropriate to demining operations is provided at every task site. All
demining personnel receive twenty-four hours of first aid instruction as part of basic
deminer training and a further 16 hours as part of annual refresher training. Medical and
emergency support provided to the team involved in this accident was adequate for the
circumstances. Because there is no road to the task site area, ambulances to support the
team are stationed at the bottom of the mountain approximately two kilometres from the
task site.
43. National standards require that a casualty evacuation exercise should be carried out
immediately on first arrival at any task site and routinely at least once each month. This
task started on 02 July. The on-site log book records that exercises were carried out on
10 and 22 July and on 10 and 18 August. The hand-written heading on the page of the
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August logbook where this has been recorded has been altered from July to read August
2006 and the column headed ‘Date’ has been altered from 10.07, to read 10.08. The
same entry was made by the same hand in the July logbook for 10 July. Although the
Board of Inquiry consider these alterations to be worthy of note, it is accepted that that
this could possibly be a simple administrative error.
44. At 0715 hours the casualty was removed from the area in the team’s ambulance vehicle,
driven by [Name removed], and taken to the city hospital in Garm, approximately ten
kilometres from the site. Immediately on arrival at the hospital, [the Victim] was admitted
to the emergency department and transferred into the operating theatre.
45. Further evacuation from Garm hospital was available by military VIP helicopter if required
and helicopter availability and operations provided by the Ministry of Defence were
adequate throughout the course of the medical evacuation to Dushanbe.
46. Up to 31 August 2006, injured deminer [the Victim] was unable to recall any of the events
leading up to the accident which is the subject of this report. He is making progress in
hospital but will remain unaware of the full extent of his injuries until doctors decide he is
ready to be told. Although his face is very seriously injured, he still has his facial features
and his nose and ears are intact. His lips are very badly damaged and he has lost some
teeth. One eye is missing and the other eye is very seriously damaged. A full evaluation
of his condition has not been made yet.

PERSONALITIES INVOLVED
47. Personnel directly involved in the accident were members of Mine Action Team No 1,
from [International demining group] Dushanbe. [Table of names removed.]
48. All team members are trained and qualified deminers. All personnel have completed and
passed at least one [International demining group] basic deminer training course. Most
members of the team have limited experienced in mine action activities and have
received instruction in first aid as part of their basic training. Deminers’ job descriptions
state that part of their duties is to assist with the treatment and evacuation of casualties in
the event of a mine accident. Deminers’ Job Description is shown at Annex H.
49. The team had been working at the area since 2 July 2006 and their last days of rest were
on 30 July to 04 August. This was their second operational deployment since their basic
training, which they completed just prior to their initial deployment on 2 July 2006.

EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
50. The deminer involved in this accident was deployed with a standard-issue [International
demining group] deminer’s toolkit. The items mentioned below were found at the scene of
the accident. Evidence at the site and interviews with team members indicate that tools
were being used correctly.
51. Metal detector – Ebinger model 420H. The detector batteries were found to be flat when
the board of inquiry team inspected the site on 23 August, because it had remained
switched on for more than two days after the accident. On-site testing showed that the
Ebinger detector is capable of locating PMN anti-personnel mines to the required depth in
the type of soil encountered at this task site. When the detector was recovered from the
scene of the accident a new battery was installed and, when tested, the detector
appeared to be 100% effective.
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52. Prodder - A stainless steel prodder was found next to the crater and it was clear that,
although ready for deployment, this tool was not in immediate use at the time when the
mine detonated.
53. Pin hammer, normally used for driving wooden marker pickets into the ground. This was
laid neatly on the ground, next to the manual prodder tool.
54. Trowel – A stainless steel, blast-resistant trowel, manufactured by LVP Technology of
South Africa, (http://www.lvptech.com/Main.htm) was in the crater left by the blast of the
mine. The trowel was severely damaged, the final 2cm of the point of the blade is rolled
back on itself and the handle is bent completely over the blade.
[The trowel before and after the accident is shown below. This is sold as blast resistant
because the material does not break. However, the length is not as recommended in IMAS,
the metal handguard has broken and the handgrip has been removed in the blast.]

55. Base-stick and clearance lane marking tape – The base stick and clearance lane marking
tape normally used by deminers in clearance lanes was laid askew, lying diagonally
across the clearance lane. It looked as though it was probably disturbed during the
detonation or at some time soon afterwards. The Board of Inquiry team agreed that,
taking into account the general disposition of this equipment, it seemed most likely that
[the Victim] had been using the base stick in an approved manner prior to the accident.
56. All personal protective equipment (PPE) at the site conformed to Paragraph 4 of UN
International Mine Action Standard 10.30, in that it was capable of protecting against the
effects of an explosive blast as follows:
n) Frontal protection. Appropriate to the activity, capable of protecting against
the blast effects of 240g of TNT at 30cm from the closest part of the body.
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PPE equipment used by [International demining group] in Tajikistan is
provided by ROFI, of Norway. http://www.rofi.com/
o) Eye protection. Capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240g
of TNT at 60cm, providing full frontal coverage of face and throat as part of
the specified frontal protection ensemble. Facial visors used by [International
demining group] in Tajikistan are manufactured by Security Devices of
Zimbabwe. http://www.secdevinc.com/

DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED
57. Bakelite, metal and rubber fragments recovered from the crater created by the blast of the
explosion show that the mine involved was a Russian PMN anti-personnel blast mine.
The crater left by the detonation is as would be expected from such a device. See Annex
I.
58. A PMN anti-personnel mine is loaded with 240 grams of high explosive and a 9 gram
booster charge. It is designed to be operated by 8 to 25Kg of pressure from above.
[Pictures of PMN removed.]
59. Analysis of the crater caused by the detonation shows that the mine involved in this
accident was buried at a depth of approximately 2 to 14 centimetres in the ground. The
mine was inside the marked clearance lane where deminer [the Victim] was working at
the time of the accident. See Annex J.
60. From a military point of view, the place where the mine was laid could be considered a
good location on which to site a defensive position or observation post. As such, any
operation to deny the land to enemy forces might be expected to emplace landmines
there.

DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
61. All members of the team involved were issued with their own set of personal protective
equipment consisting of a blast-resistant apron and a blast-resistant visor. When [the
Victim] was evacuated from the clearance lane he was still wearing his blast-resistant
apron. His visor sustained some slight damage, probably as it was blown from his face; it
was recovered from a point approximately three metres outside the cleared lane during
the Board of Inquiry inspection of the accident site. It was also approximately three
metres from where [the Victim] landed after the mine detonated. Images of [the Victim]’s
Personal Protective Equipment are shown at Annex K.
62. Each member of the team was also wearing a pair of 100% cotton trousers and a 100%
cotton jacket, issued by [International demining group]. Leather working gloves are also
issued but [the Victim] was not wearing these at the time of the accident.
63. Polycarbonate face visor. Eye protection is essential in manual demining and each
deminer is issued with a personal face shield manufactured from 5mm Polycarbonate and
equipped with a head-frame made from ballistic Aramid covered with waterproof nylon.
Injuries sustained by [the Victim] indicate very clearly that either he was not wearing his
visor at the time the mine detonated in front of him or he was wearing the visor
incorrectly. It is possible that he lifted the visor, partially or fully, away from his face in
order to get a clearer view of the ground or of something else. If the visor is lifted away
from the operator’s face even slightly, away from the collar of the blast resistant apron
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wherein it normally rests, it can provide a gap in the deminer’s frontal protection through
which the effects of an explosive blast may enter. See following image.
64. Deminers’ protective visors are manufactured by heat-forming 5mm untreated
polycarbonate in special ovens. Polycarbonate scratches and marks easily if not looked
after very carefully and can become difficult to see through clearly. Although minor
scratches and marks do not significantly degrade the visor’s performance against the
effects of explosive blast, Polycarbonate degrades in sunlight and the UN Mine Action
Service recommends that visors should usually be replaced each year.
65. The blast resistant visor is the crux of this investigation. During the Board of Inquiry’s time
at the demining task site and the scene of the accident, a number of visors were
observed by each member of the team. Some were in good condition, others were less
so. If a visor is clear and clean and unmarked it is obviously easier to see through and
there will obviously be less temptation for a deminer to lift his visor to attain a better view
of his work or surroundings.
66. Protective facial visors are notoriously difficult to wear and deminers universally do not
like to wear them. This is particularly the case in hot weather, when they can become
fogged with condensation from the wearer’s breath. When reasons for raising visors are
given by deminers, they commonly make reference to a lack of optical clarity when
looking through the visor. This may be blamed on light scratching, breath condensation,
distracting optics (caused by reflections and refracted sunlight), airlessness and
excessive heat. [The Victim’s visor is shown below.]

67. There is sufficient damage inside the visor to suggest that it deflected environmental and
mine-case fragmentation onto [the Victim’s]’s face from the detonation of the PMN antipersonnel mine he was likely excavating at the time of the accident. From this it seems
very likely that [the Victim] was using his trowel and excavating vertically over the mine
with his visor at least partly raised.
[Damage to the Victim’s body armour makes it likely that a closed visor would have also
sustained significant damage low down.]

11

68. Interrogation of the online International Database of Demining Incidents and Victims,
(www.ddasonline.com) shows that the eye protection issued to accident victim(s) was
either not worn or worn in the raised position in more than 40% of all recorded accidents
that have occurred during excavation of the ground (either area-excavation or the
excavation involved with investigating a metal-detector signal). The result is
often blindness in one or both eyes. The unusual severity of the head injury that incurred
in this accident implies that the victim's head may have been closer to the device than
usual. If the victim was crouching low over the device when he initiated it this may explain
the unusually severe injury.

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF ACCIDENT
69. The team’s work at this task site started on 2 July after a tasking from TMAC to
[International demining group] and a subsequent deployment from Dushanbe. The team
arrived in the area during the afternoon of that day and set up their camp with
accommodation tents and a field kitchen.
70. The day before the accident was a Sunday, a day of rest for the team, and most
personnel, including [the Victim], went to the nearby town of Garm where they used the
public bath house and ate lunch in various local restaurants.
71. Activities on the night before the accident followed a normal routine pattern and after
eating dinner at about seven o’clock, team members, including [the Victim], watched
television and then went to their beds between nine o’clock and ten-thirty, the same time
as usual.
72. No evidence was found that any person at this task site was suffering from illness or
sickness or had any reason to behave in any way that would be considered as out of the
ordinary. No alcohol or drugs are permitted on the task site area and deminers are
forbidden to consume alcohol during their tours of duty on operational tasks.
73. On the day of the accident, team members awoke and arose, as usual, at between four
and four-thirty in the morning. No breakfast was taken by the team and, after a visit to the
bathroom and latrine, a routine morning safety briefing was delivered by the Team Leader
and all team members were at work in the minefield by 0500hrs.
74. Breakfast at this site depends on the availability of water. The site cook reports that, if
water is available, team members have bread and tea with sugar and butter before
starting work at 0500hrs. If water is not available first thing in the morning, then the team
will instead receive breakfast after the cook has collected water from the local stream. On
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such days this usually means that breakfast is taken at between six and seven o’clock in
the morning.
75. The minefield clearance of the task site is in several separate areas. [The Victim] went to
the Northern end of the minefield, started work and continued his duties of searching for
landmines, working along the clearance lane towards a north westerly direction and using
approved procedures, in accordance with normal working practices and [International
demining group]’s published Standing Operational Procedures.
76. On returning to the clearance lane after the rest break, [the Victim] started to work by
clearing a new one-metre wide lane next to the lane he had recently completed. He used
a base stick, in accordance with [International demining group] SOP, to mark the limit of
his exploration into the uncleared area and standard-issue tools to carry out the work of
search and clearance within the lane.
77. A short distance along this new clearance lane [the Victim] was confronted by a rocky
outcrop which he knew that he was required to clear in the same way as he would have
cleared any other piece of ground.
78. [The Victim] is unable to recall what happened to him beyond this point. Informed
conjecture based upon observations at the site and interviews with team members
suggests that this is what happened:
p) [The Victim] was progressing from the south to the north along his clearance
lane when he heard a signal from his metal detector to indicate that there
was a piece of metal in the ground within the designated search area in front
of him.
q) He began to investigate the signal, but it was within a hole amongst the rocks
in front of him, in a place where he would have had to reach down at least
half-a-metre in order to excavate the cause of the signal.
r)

To avoid the problem of reaching down, he walked forward, within his search
lane and over solid rock, to approach the area of the signal from the Northern
end of his search lane.

s) Continuing his SOP drills he began to excavate the area of the source of the
signal to the metal detector using the trowel issued to him for this purpose.
He may not have been working to the SOP drill, as it seems likely that,
because of the restricted area of work caused by the surrounding rocks, he
was digging directly down to the mine, rather than digging across to the mine
by excavating a small trench.
t)

An explosion occurred when the PMN antipersonnel mine, which was the
source of the metal detector signal, detonated.

79. At the time of detonation the area of ground wherein the mine was buried was in shadow,
whilst at the same time the sun was rising over the horizon into [the Victim]’s face. This
combination of light and shadow would probably have made observation more difficult
than normal.
80. Marks made by the effects of explosive blast and shattered stones onto the rock around
the crater suggest that the mine may have been laid at an angle, with the pressure plate
aiming directly towards the direction from where [the Victim] was approaching.
81. A cut turf next to the crater and the position of the casualty after the detonation indicate
that [the Victim] was approaching the mine from the western direction, facing east.
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TIMELINE 21 AUG 2006 - THE DAY OF ACCIDENT
0400 or 0430: Morning wake-up call at Shull demining task site.
0430-0440: Morning routine.
0440-0450: Daily safety briefing from Supervisor [Name removed]
0500: Team starts work in Shull minefield.
0540: Section Leader – [Name removed] checks [the Victim]’s work before rest break.
0550-0600: First rest break of daily routine.
0616: Explosion.
06??: Team Leader [Name removed] phones [International demining group] HQ office in
Dushanbe to inform about accident.
0620: Casualty recovered from point of explosion and carried on a stretcher to the medical
point.
0622: Medics attend to casualty.
0630: Group begins descending the mountain, carrying casualty on a stretcher to the vehicle
point.
0700: TMAC Quality Assurance Officer – [Name removed] receives first call from TMAC
Manager - [Name removed] about the accident.
0715: [International demining group] Vehicle leaves site for the nearest hospital, located in
the city of Garm.
0721: Casualty arrives at hospital, is admitted to emergency and transferred into operating
theatre.
0735: TMAC Quality Assurance Officer arrives at MoD Centre for Helicopters in Aini.
0850: Helicopter leaves for Garm with TMAC QA Officer, [Name removed] (MoD), [Name
removed] ([International demining group]), [Name removed] ([International demining group]
operations Officer), [Name removed] ([International demining group] Translator), [Name
removed] ([International demining group] team leader).
0940: Helicopter arrives at Garm airport.
1340: Casualty and two accompanying doctors leave hospital for airport with [QA Officer]
(TMAC), [Name removed] (MoD), [Name removed] ([International demining group]).
1406: Helicopter leaves Garm.
1456: Helicopter arrives in Dushanbe and casualty is transferred to Russian Military Hospital.
1520: Casualty arrives at Russian Military Hospital and is taken to the operating theatre.
82. Selected statements from team members are shown at Annex L.

ORGANISATION OF IMMEDIATE REACTION
83. Medic [Name removed] states that during the immediate moments after the accident he
contacted the nearby demining task site at Chorcharog to inform them about what had
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happened. This caused medics and members of the team at Chorchaog to drive to the
ambulance point at Shull.
84. Medic [Name removed] also states that he instructed, by VHF radio, the driver of the
[International demining group] truck at Shull to go to the hospital at Garm to inform them
what had happened. Team Leader [Name removed] states that he too made this
instruction by VHF radio.
85. At 7:20 [Name removed], chief of engineering services at MoD, received a phone call
from TMAC National Director [Name removed] regarding the accident. At 7:25 at the
Ministry of Defence the General began working on deploying a helicopter to retrieve the
victim. The Air Force commander ordered a helicopter to depart at 7:50 am. When [Name
removed] arrived in Garm 45 minutes later, [the Victim] was in the hospital.
86. Helicopter evacuation from Garm to Dushanbe was carried out in a satisfactory manner
and the helicopter was made available promptly and efficiently.
87. [International demining group] initially reported that, probably due to the early hour of the
day, on first arrival at the hospital in Garm appropriate doctors were not available to
provide treatment to the injured deminer. It is most likely that this situation could have
been improved if communications from the scene of the accident to the hospital had been
established over a mobile telephone and perhaps a running commentary of the situation
might then have been relayed to the hospital while doctors were being contacted.

SUMMARY
88. Injuries sustained by [the Victim] indicate very clearly that either he was not wearing his
visor at the time the mine detonated in front of him, or the visor he was wearing was lifted
away from his face and out of the collar of his protective apron.
89. Management and supervision at the task site could be improved. This applies from [the
Victim] not requesting supervisory advice from his immediate supervisor, to the frequency
of managerial and Quality Assurance visits to the task site.

CONCLUSIONS
90. It would be easy to conclude that this accident was the result of simple human error.
However, at closer inspection it is apparent that this task site could be improved with
more supervision from senior management and more attention to detail in reporting and
during practices of casualty evacuation procedures.
91. The accident also underscores the need to ensure that deminers observe and maintain
the standards they are taught during basic training. On realising that the initial signal on
his metal detector emanated from a place on the ground which was difficult to access,
[the Victim] should have called for assistance. It is likely that he would then have been
advised to work around the rock systematically, or to start a new clearance lane to
approach the signal from a new direction. More importantly, any such call for assistance
should have led to a pause in [the Victim]’s work and provided an opportunity to think
about the likelihood of danger ahead and consider appropriate actions to minimise the
risks taken.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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92. All members of the team involved in this accident should undergo at least three eight-hour
days of refresher training and psychological counselling before being re-deployed to any
demining task.
93. Adherence to Standing Operational Procedures. It is possible that the following routine
SOP measures could have reduced the risk to deminer [the Victim]:
u) All personnel at all work sites should conform to all aspects of [International
demining group]’s Standing Operational Procedures. Specifically, this should
mean that, when they are working within hazardous areas, personnel
deployed on mine clearance operations should wear PPE complete with visor
in the fully down position to completely cover the wearer’s face.
v) If a deminer comes across a situation where normal SOPs do not apply, he
should call the Section Leader, Team Leader or Supervisor. This gives pause
to the operation, brings in a more senior person to assist the deminer and
allows time for thought about what to do next. In the specific context of this
demining accident, it is likely that the Section Leader, Team Leader or
Supervisor would have advised that a fresh start should have been made to
clear the lane from the North or North West direction.
94. [International demining group] should institute a system of husbandry, maintenance and
quality control on all visors at every task site. This should include at least the following.
w) Daily cleaning sessions.
x) Daily inspections by Section Leader, Team Leader or Supervisor.
y) Inspections of visors during senior staff visits to task sites.
z) Registration of serial numbers of each visor issued to each deminer.
aa) Annual renewal of every visor.
95. TMAC should deploy the national Quality Assurance Inspector to:
bb) Check a percentage of deminers’ visors at each task site as part of routine
QA inspections.
cc) Monitor Casevac practices; this should be implemented in agreement with
[International demining group].
dd) Check the on-site logbook thoroughly and ensure that all parts of the log are
being used appropriately and accurately. This includes Attendance Sheets,
Quality Control Logbook, Casevac Exercise Log, and all other pages in the
logbook.
ee) Report on frequency of management visits to the site.
96. [The Victim] was on night-time sentry duty from 2 a.m. to 4 a.m. on the morning of the
accident and may have been tired and hungry on that morning. [International demining
group] should institute a formal regime of eating before work starts at the beginning of
each day. Deminers should eat breakfast before starting work – there are recorded
instances from other countries where deminers have been involved in demining accidents
which were probably caused partly because their minds and bodies were not functioning
properly first thing in the morning after working without sustenance since the night before.
97. [International demining group] should write an SOP to establish drills and procedures to
be used by deminers when searching and clearing rocky outcrops.
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98. [International demining group] should increase the frequency of management,
supervisory, technical and Quality Assurance visits to task sites.
99. The local hospital should always be contacted by telephone during any incident which will
involve a casualty being taken to the hospital.
100.
As recommended in the Board of Inquiry report for the accident which occurred on 19
April 2006, a casualty evacuation exercise should be carried out from every task site
during the first twelve hours at any newly appointed task site. This should be followed by
a casualty evacuation exercise at least once each month. Such exercises should be
recorded in the site log book together with the names of all personnel who carried out the
exercise. In order to confirm communications, all casevac exercises should always
include a telephone call from the task site to the local hospital. All personnel at the task
site should be involved in the exercise and all appropriate personnel (at least medics and
ambulance drivers) should travel from the task site all the way to the door of the hospital
emergency department.
101.
[International demining group] should ensure that all parts of on-site logbooks are
properly completed on a daily basis.
102.
As recommended in the Board of Inquiry report for the accident which occurred on 19
April 2006, the Board of Inquiry recommends again that, in order to better reflect good
practices and recent developments in mine action, [International demining group] SOP
should be reviewed and updated urgently.

Signed: UNDP Chief Technical Adviser; Chief of Engineering, Ministry of Defence; Quality
Assurance Officer, TMAC

Annexes
Initial report of mine accident
Terms of Reference for Board of Inquiry
Example pages from Team’s on-site logbook
1:50,000 Map
Images of site and general area
Sketch plan of the site
TMAC QA Report
Deminers’ Job description
Details of PMN Anti Personnel Mine
Crater analysis
PPE images
Deminers’ Statements

DISTRIBUTION: TMAC National Programme Director,; [International demining group]
Dushanbe; UNDP CO Dushanbe; DDIV/DDAS
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Victim Report
Victim number: 645

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 19

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: no

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: One hour, five minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, visor
worn raised

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Arms
severe Face
severe Hands
severe Head
severe Legs
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes
COMMENT: See Medical report.

Medical report
21 August, 2006
Extracts from the medical report of the patient stationed at the dispensary

DoB: 1987
Dates of : arrival to the hospital 21 August, 200; left the hospital: 21 August, 2006
Diagnosis: Closed cranial-cerebral injury. Concussion to the brain. Open fragmentation
fracture of the left cheekbone without dislocation. Both eyes: avulsion of eye-bulbs with
prolepses and drainage of vitreous substance. Open fragmentation fracture of the left
cheekbone.
Brief anamnesis, diagnostic examination, process of the disease, conducted treatment and
status during the arrival and in the discharging period.
The patient [Name removed] (born in 1987) arrived in Central District Hospital (CDH) in Rasht
in a very difficult condition. According to confirmations by his accompanying personnel, he
was injured during mine clearance in a minefield on 21 August 2006 at approx. at 06:16. He
was evacuated to the surgery department of the CDH by an ambulance. The general
condition of the patient during his arrival in the hospital was very serious and he could not
answer to questions. He was in a half-conscious like condition. Arterial pressure was 70/40.
The pulse was 120 times per minute. During examination of the face a large crushed
lacerated wound, necrotic webs, a torn rag of the left side of the cheek area and the area
closed to ears were observed. Open fragmentation fracture of the left cheekbone without
dislocation was also observed. After appropriate preparation, an initial operation of the injuries
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of the face was done under the endo- tracheal narcosis. The torn rag of the left side of the
cheek was sewn layer by layer. Drainage-tubes and aseptic bandage were installed.
21 August, 2006
Signed: Attending physician
The pictures below show the Victim before and after surgery.

Photographs showed one leg bandaged top to bottom, the other peppered with small
fragmentation wounds at the thigh. Both hands were bandaged and bloody with lacerations of
the fingers.
31st August 2006 below

Email 21st August 2006 from Demining group National manager:
“Today the operator had another surgery in Russian military hospital for 1hr 30min on his
eyes. No frags in his skull. I've talked with the doctor who made surgery, she said that [the
Victim] lost sight in both eyes.”

STATEMENTS
Statement no.1: Team Leader, MAT 1
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30 and lined the team members up
and briefed them about safety instructions and compliance with them and sent all the
deminers and section leaders to the site. All the deminers began to work at 5 o’clock sharp. At
5:50 I whistled for “10 minutes’ break”. After break everybody was back to his clearance lane.
I went to the deminer [Name removed]’s lane and was giving him some advice when at this
moment, at approx. at 6:16 there was an explosion at the deminer [the Victim]’s site. The
Team Leader [Name removed] immediately shouted in the radio: Mine Accident! Mine
Accident! I ordered the deminers [Name removed] and [Name removed] to bring the stretcher
and I hurried to the site of the accident. When I reached the location, the deminers who
worked closer to [the Victim] as well as the Team Leader [Name removed], were already
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there. The deminer [Name removed] checked around the mine victim with a mine detector
and the victim was evacuated on the stretcher from the mine field up to the medic. The
medics offered first aid to him. At approx. at 6.30 hrs I informed [Name removed] –
[International demining group] National Manager – by my mobile phone. Then, I sent
[International demining group] driver [Name removed] to the Central District Hospital in Rasht
to inform the doctors to be ready. At this moment we carried the mine victim down from the
mountain and took him to the hospital by [International demining group] ambulance. The
doctors examined the victim and asked me to call the [International demining group] HQ in
Dushanbe to send a helicopter to evacuate the victim to Dushanbe Hospital. I called [Name
removed] by my mobile phone. The helicopter arrived at 09:45 hrs. At approx. 10 o’clock the
following personnel arrived at Garm Hospital: [Name removed], [Name removed], [Name
removed], [Name removed] and [Name removed]. At about 13:50 hrs the doctors finished
operating on the mine victim and then the victim was taken to the airport and was evacuated
by helicopter to Dushanbe together with one of the [International demining group] medics
doctor [Name removed], [Name removed] and [Name removed]. I wrote the statement myself
and have nothing to add.
Signed: 22 August, 2006

Statement no.2: deminer: MAT 1
On 21 August, 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. I put on my PPE. After listening to
the safety briefing from my supervisor I signed the Safety Briefings Logbook and walked to
the minefield. At my lane, I fixed the tapes which were opened due to the wind. I began mine
clearance for 50 minutes. Later the Team Leader came and tested my cleared lane with a
mine detector. Then we had a break for 10 minutes and returned to begin mine clearance
again. After some minutes there was an explosion. The Team Leader shouted: Mine
Accident! I closed my lane and ran towards the mine victim. I wrote the statement myself and
have nothing to add.
Signed: 21 August, 2006

Statement no.3: Medic: MAT 1
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed] – [International demining group] Medic, MAT 1, woke
up at 04:30 together with other team members. At 04:50 I went to the medical point. At 05:50
the deminers stopped the work for a break and in 10 minutes they were back to their sites and
began working. At approx. 06:16 a mine accident occurred and the team leader [Name
removed] informed me by radio that a mine accident occurred and [the Victim] is injured.
Medic [Name removed], who was farther away in his station called me by radio. I asked him if
he could come to the medic’s point. He came. The victim was brought to us within 5 minutes
after the accident. We - both medics offered the first aid to the victim. In 7-8 minutes we
began to evacuate the victim and at about 07:20 we took the victim to the Central District
Hospital in Garm. The doctors at the hospital offered their assistance. Later we were told by
Dushanbe office that a helicopter is coming for assistance. At about 15:00-15:10 we put the
victim on board of the helicopter. Medic [Name removed] joined the victim in the helicopter
and went to Dushanbe and I remained with the team. I wrote the statement myself and have
nothing to add.
Signed: 22 August, 2006
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Statement no.4: Cook and deminer: MAT 1
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. After tidying the yard, I was making
breakfast for the deminers when I suddenly heard the explosion. I wrote the statement myself
and have nothing to add.
Signed: 21 August, 2006

Statement no.5: Section One Leader
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. I put on my PPE and lined the
team members up and briefed them about safety instructions together with [Name removed]. I
and all the deminers signed in the Safety Briefings Logbook and went to the minefield. All the
deminers began to work at 5 o’clock sharp. At 5:50 the Team Leader whistled for “10 minutes’
break”. After 10 min. the Team Leader called everybody back to work. I began to inspect all
the deminer’s performance. I was inspecting deminer [Name removed]’s work when suddenly,
at approx. at 6:16 hrs, there was an explosion. The Team Leader [Name removed]
immediately shouted: Mine Accident! I saw dust at the deminer [the Victim]’s site. I hurried
towards the site of the mine accident. The Team Leader [Name removed] and [Name
removed] were already there. The victim was evacuated on the stretcher from the mine field
up to the medics. The medics offered their first aid to him. Together with the Team Leader
[Name removed], both medics and 12 deminers carried the victim down to the ambulance.
Then the Team Leader [Name removed] together with both medics and 7 deminers took the
victim to the Central District Hospital in Rasht by [International demining group] ambulance. I,
together with 5 deminers, remained and went back to the campsite. I wrote the statement
myself and have nothing to add.
Signed: 22 August, 2006

Statement no.6: Section leader, MAT 1
On 21 August, 2006 I, [Name removed], Section leader, MAT 1 woke up at 04:30. I put on my
PPE. After listening to the safety briefing from my supervisor, I signed the Safety Briefings
Logbook and walked over to the minefield. I cleared the mined area at my lane for 50
minutes. Then we had a 10-minute break. After 15-20 minutes after the break, I heard an
explosion and ordered the deminers to stop mine clearance. I immediately went towards the
mine victim. We evacuated him from the minefield and took him to the medic. I wrote the
statement myself and have nothing to add.
Signed: 21 August, 2006

Statement no.7: deminer from MAT 1
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. I put on my PPE. After listening to
the safety briefing from my supervisor I signed the Safety Briefings Logbook and walked to
the minefield to my lane and fixed the tapes which were opened due to the wind. Then, I
began mine clearance. Later the Team Leader came and tested my cleared lane with a mine
detector. In Approx. 15-20 min. after the break, there was an explosion and I saw how
deminer [the Victim] was thrown about one metre away from where he was working. The
Team Leader ordered the deminers to stop mine clearance. I closed my lane and went
towards the mine victim. The Team Leader instructed us to place the victim on the stretcher
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and evacuated him from the minefield up to the medic. I wrote the statement myself and have
nothing to add.
Signed: 21 August, 2006

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because it seems that the
Victim encountered an unusual situation with a mine placed in a cleft between rocks. Instead
of asking for instructions, he raised his visor and worked on the mine from directly above, so
putting his face inside the fragmentation cone associated with an AP mine blast.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim had raised
his visor and begun to work in a very dangerous position but his errors were not corrected.
The fact that the International demining group did not have SOPs for the situation and had not
revised their SOPs as required after previous accidents is a significant “Management control
inadequacy”. The fact that the SOPs had still not been revised over a year later adds to the
impression of an uncaring/incompetent management team.
The Victim was a 19 year old conscript soldier, with the physique of a boy, as illustrated in the
arm injury shown below.

It is unfortunate that pictures of the accident investigation show International demining group
expatriate investigators at the site wearing no PPE. This obviously sets a very bad example.
They were inside a partly cleared minefield and – according to National standards and the
demining group’s SOPs – should have been wearing PPE. The BoI investigators all wore PPE
at the accident scene.
The International demining group investigators below are on the rocky outcrop where the
accident occurred. The fact that they gave the picture to the BoI implies that they did not know
that they were in breach of their own SOPs.

The “Inadequate medical provision” listed under Notes refers to the fact that no CASEVAC
practice had been conducted and the Supervisor did not know how to react when the accident
occurred. He sent a “runner” down the mountain to the hospital rather than use his telephone.
This BoI is unusually thorough and one of the best on record. If it has a failing, it is that the
National Authority displayed an unusual degree of patience over the failure of the
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International demining group involved to take its previous post-accident requirements
seriously. The demining group was the only one operating in-country and there was an
understandable reluctance to suspend its operations.
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